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MIłOSz JANuSz zIELIńSkI
SubJEcTS OF ThE EMpRESS. 
WIdER cONTExT OF REgIONAL hISTORy 
 EducATION ON EAST pRuSSIA 
 ANd  IdENTITy pROcESSES  IN cONTEMpORARy 
kALININgRAd ObLAST
A b s t r a c t
Political, economic and social changes brought about 
by the dissolution of the Soviet Union have had a significant 
impact on Kaliningrad Oblast, the empire’s westernmost 
territory of geostrategic importance. Formerly belonging to 
the German province of East Prussia, the region was meant 
to become Sovietised completely. The end of the Cold War 
led to a complete bankruptcy of such policies. At the turn 
of the 80s and 90s the emergence of a grass-roots interest 
in the officially forbidden parts of the Oblast’s history made 
the question of the relation between its pre-war and post-
war past up-to-date. Its topicality was strengthened after 
the 2005-06 commemorations of founding the city of Königs-
berg and Kaliningrad Oblast, in which both central and regional 
authorities were heavily involved. This paper aims at identify-
ing how elements of the history of East Prussia have been se-
lected, interpreted and incorporated into the regional history 
education course books in contemporary Kaliningrad Oblast. It 
argues that the growing criticism of the course books’ con-
tents has been related to Russia’s domestic situation since 
the 2012 presidential election and the tensions with the West 
after 2014. Both events have hastened the process of forming 
and cementing the so-called new Russian conservatism which 
has had a growing influence on the Baltic semiexclave.
K e y  w o r d s: Kaliningrad Oblast; Russian Federation; Soviet 
Union; East Prussia; history education; regional identity; na-
tional identity
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pOddANI cESARzOWEJ. SzEROkI kONTEkST REgIONALNEJ EdukAcJI 
hISTORyczNEJ NA TEMAT pRuS WSchOdNIch A pROcESy TOżSAMOścIOWE 
WE WSpółczESNyM ObWOdzIE kALININgRAdzkIM
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Zmiany polityczne, gospodarcze i społeczne spowodowane rozpadem Związku Sowieckiego wywar-
ły głęboki wpływ na obwód kaliningradzki, najdalej wysunięty na zachód obszar imperium o dużym 
znaczeniu geostrategicznym. Obwód, wcześniej wchodzący w skład niemieckich Prus Wschodnich, 
miał zostać całkowicie zsowietyzowany. Koniec zimnej wojny doprowadził do bankructwa takiej po-
lityki. Na przełomie lat osiemdziesiątych i dziewięćdziesiątych pojawienie się oddolnego zaintereso-
wania oficjalnie zakazanymi częściami historii obwodu spowodowało, że pytanie o stosunek między 
jego przeszłością przedwojenną i powojenną stało się bardzo aktualne. Ten stan został wzmocniony 
po uroczystościach związanych z założeniem miasta Królewiec i obwodu kaliningradzkiego w latach 
2005-06, w które zaangażowały się zarówno władze centralne, jak i regionalne. Niniejszy artykuł ma 
na celu prześledzenie, w jaki sposób elementy historii Prus Wschodnich zostały wybrane, zinterpre-
towane i włączone do podręczników poświęconych historii regionu we współczesnym obwodzie ka-
liningradzkim. Autor argumentuje, że  rosnąca krytyka treści podręczników związana jest z sytuacją 
wewnętrzną Rosji po wyborach prezydenckich w 2012 roku oraz rosnącymi napięciami w stosun-
kach z państwami zachodnimi. Obydwa wydarzenia przyspieszyły proces kształtowania i krzepnięcia 
tak zwanego nowego rosyjskiego projektu konserwatywnego, który wywiera coraz większy wpływ 
na bałtycką półeksklawę.
S ł o w a  k l u c z o w e: obwód kaliningradzki; Federacja Rosyjska; Związek Sowiecki; Prusy Wschod-
nie; nauczanie historii; tożsamość regionalna; tożsamość narodowa
INTROducTION
Changes brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union have had a significant impact on Kaliningrad Oblast, the empire’s westernmost part incorporated in 1945. Created as a rudimentary negation of its pre-war predecessor, Germany’s East 
Prussia, the region was meant to become sovietised in every possible aspect. In particu-
lar, its seven-century-long history was to be rewritten from the perspective of Marxism-
Leninism and Russo-Slavic imperialism, discrediting East Prussia as a militarist, aggressive 
and anti-Slavic political entity, the destruction of which was an act of historical justice. This 
narrative was intended to become deeply rooted into the mindset of the new inhabitants 
of the Oblast who came from various parts of the Soviet Union. They were very often 
too young to remember the pre-October Revolution period, which additionally intensified 
the impact of the new approach (Костяшов, 1996, p. 87; Сологубов, 2012, p. 41).
The end of the Cold War led to a complete bankruptcy of such policies. The emer-
gence of a spontaneous, grass-roots interest in alternative visions of the Oblast’s history, 
initially in very limited circles of regional intelligentsia and nomenclature, made the ques-
tion of relations between the pre-war and post-war past of the region increasingly impor-
tant (Дементьев, 2014). The real boom took place when information technologies started 
to spread in the city of Kaliningrad and, to some extent, in other parts of the Oblast. It 
resulted in a growing number of ordinary citizens taking part in the discussion on what 
East Prussia means on the one hand, and what it should mean on the other hand for con-
temporary Kaliningraders. Together with academicians, politicians and NGO activists they 
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started asking questions to what extent the ‘East Prussianness’ could be compatible with 
the ‘Sovietness’ and the ‘Russianness’ on regional, local and individual levels.
It is now visible that this discussion has become a part of a broader, Russian-wide 
discourse on the reinterpretation of both the Russian and the Soviet history, also in terms 
of shaping the national and regional history education. In this article I take a close look at 
how the 1871-1945 period of the history of East Prussia (from the unification of Germany 
until the defeat of the Third Reich in World War Two) has been portrayed in the regional 
history course books in Kaliningrad Oblast. Their contents have been put into both the re-
gional context and the developments in Russia since 2012: the emergence of the so-
called new conservatism and the sharp deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West 
after the annexation of Crimea and breaking out of the war in Eastern Ukraine. I have 
sought to explain how criticism of the course books was influenced by these changes af-
fecting Russia in general and Kaliningrad Oblast in particular.
In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals I have used a variety of research ma-
terial. The background knowledge on the history of East Prussia and Kaliningrad Ob-
last was provided by books by C. Clark (Clark, 2009), Ю. В. Костяшов (Костяшов, 2009), 
A. Kossert, R. Traba (Traba, 2005) and A. Sakson (Sakson, 2011). Works by O. Sezneva 
(Sezneva, 2007, 2010, 2013) and И. О. Дементьев (Дементьев, 2014) gave a specific look 
at how attitudes towards the pre-war past evolved in Kaliningrad Oblast. The central part 
of the article revolves around the regional history course books written by Г. В. Кретинин, 
А. П. Клемешев, Ю. В. Костяшов and Г. М. Федоров for grades from 6 to 11 (Клемешев, Ко-
стяшов, & Федоров, 2007; Кретинин, 2007a, 2007b).
In order to confront the contents of the course books with the overall context of in-
ternal developments in Russia since the turn of 2011 and 2012, I have used a number 
of articles from the presidential campaign published by V. Putin in various Russian media 
outlets (Путин 2012a; Путин 2012b; Путин 2012c) and studies analysing them, such as 
those on the ‘new conservatism’ originating from the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern 
Studies (Rodkiewicz & Rogoża, 2015; Rogoża, 2013). Criticism of their contents has pre-
dominantly been present on regional web portals, but also in the Russian-wide press, 
such as “Литературная газета”.
hOW EAST pRuSSIA  (RE)AppEAREd  IN kALININgRAd ObLAST
When World War Two came to an end East Prussia was in ruins. As the very first prov-
ince of the pre-1937 Germany that the Red Army entered, it suffered not only from regu-
lar military actions, but also from the aftermath events. The vendetta of the Soviet sol-
diers was stoke up by the authorities. In the wartime and the post-war Soviet propaganda 
East Prussia was depicted as, for instance, ‘the lair of the fascist beast’ (Костяшов, 2003, 
p. 11) and ‘German Empire’s watchdog in the East’ (Костяшов, 2003, p. 14). Such an ag-
gressive way of portraying the province had calamitous effects on civilians who did not 
escape before the Red Army as well as on the material culture.
Approximately 100,000 Germans—less than 10 per cent of the pre-war population, re-
mained in the province until 1950. They were resettled to the Soviet occupational zone 
of Germany (Костяшов, 1996, p. 83). New inhabitants came mostly from the Russian, Be-
larusian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics. They were predominantly young and did not re-
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member the times prior to 1917. Speaking in terms of civilizational experience their new 
home was completely different from what they were used to. For authorities in Moscow 
the Oblast was thus a perfect place for creating homo Sovieticus (Heller, 1988).
Interest in discovering the pre-Soviet roots of the region appeared already in the second 
generation of the Kaliningrad inhabitants and grew alongside the scope of liberty in the coun-
try (Дементьев, 2014, pp. 183–184). During perestroika it took the form of hobbyists-diggers 
who semi-legally excavated old pieces of cutlery, crockery or bottles (Sezneva, 2007). Nev-
ertheless, a deeper interest in the past was shared only by a limited circle of regional intel-
ligentsia and a few members of the nomenclature (Дементьев, 2014, pp. 188–192).
The situation changed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Хоппе, 2005, 
p. 199). After the initial period of economic downturn and serious social challenges 
the notion of the pre-war history started to find its place in the everyday life of Kalinin-
graders. It even gained a nationwide attention in 2005-2006 alongside the official celebra-
tions of 700th Anniversary of Königsberg and 70th Anniversary of Kaliningrad. President 
Vladimir Putin met with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Jacques Chirac in 
Kaliningrad, where he emphasized the European roots of the city and supported the idea 
of rebuilding its historic centre (Siegień, 2016, p. 116).
The 2005-06 events marked the moment when the notion of East Prussia evolved 
from a hobby of the few to an inseparable part of a broader public debate on how it 
should be rediscovered and interpreted on a regional level. The once forbidden ‘Prus-
sian spirit’ quickly became a full-featured element of the main quotidian topic on various 
levels. Gradually a growing number of institutions, starting from the governor’s office and 
other regional governmental bodies, became involved in shaping the ‘East Prussian part’ 
of the political, economic and social agenda in contemporary Kaliningrad Oblast.
The captivation of the pre-war history topic was further strengthened by a rapid devel-
opment of information technologies. Regional portals, discussion fora and social networks 
became platforms for intensive dialogue between individuals. Favourable climate for speak-
ing about pre-1945 times openly and publicly became a trigger for the idea of introducing 
a regional history course in the secondary and high school education system in the Oblast.
ZAPADNYI KRAI:  ThE REgIONAL hISTORy cOuRSE bOOkS ANd  INITIAL 
cRITIcISM
The course on the history of the Western Land (Западный край) or Western Rus-
sia (Западная Россия) was created by a group of academicians from the Immanuel Kant 
Russian State University:1 Кретинин, Г. В. (classes 6-9), А. П. Клемешев, Ю. В. Костяшов, 
Г. М. Федоров (classes 10-11).2 The outline of the course was presented in the document 
entitled the Programme of Public Education on Regional History (Программа общего 
образования по истории края; Кретинин & Строганова 2006). It served as a basis of three 
course books: from prehistoric times to the 18th century; until the beginning of World 
War Two; since 1939-1941 until 2006. The last part tells the story of East Prussia being 
conquered by the Red Army in 1944-45, Soviet Kaliningrad Oblast being emerged and 
1 The University was founded in 1967 under the name of Kaliningrad State University. In 2005 it was renamed 
to Immanuel Kant Russian State University by President Putin and Chancellor Schröder. In 2010 President 
Medvedev renamed it to Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University.
2 In this article they will be jointly referred to as ‘authors’.
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the way developments in the region shaped after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The 
testing period of the course was launched in September 2006 in 36 schools attended 
by 2,250 students (Корвин, 2007).
By large, while discussing the Russo-Prussian relations in the 19th century, authors 
highlight their positive aspects, such as Prussia’s neutrality during the Crimean War, 
which helped Russia limit its isolation in Europe. St. Petersburg returned this favour when 
it did not oppose the unification of Germany under the reign of the Hohenzollern (Крети-
нин, 2007b, pp. 139–142). In the overall complexity of Russo-German relations East Prus-
sia played the role of a marketplace and was an area of relatively high level of freedom 
where various political ideas were free to emerge. Authors give an example of socialist 
activists whose actions contributed to preparing the ground for the 1905 revolution in 
Russia. Although they were persecuted by German law enforcement bodies, they could 
count on a fair trial and successfully defend their views (Кретинин, 2007b, pp. 139–140). 
Thus, intelligentsia felt comfortable in the city of Königsberg where atmosphere of free 
thought prevailed over the militaristic Prussian government (Кретинин, 2007b, p. 157).
Much complicated reasons for the outbreak of war in 1914 were explained very brief-
ly. Authors took laconic notes of deterioration of the Russo-German relations in 1891-
1894 (Кретинин, 2007b, pp. 141–142). When the conflict finally started in 1914 military 
actions in East Prussia were interrelated with those on the Western Front. The Russian 
army entered the province in order to fulfil its duties towards France (Кретинин, 2007b, 
p. 156). The quick assault on East Prussia in summer of 1914 is described as a strategic 
mistake resulting in Russia’s defeat in the First Battle of the Masuria Lakes (Кретинин, 
2007b, pp. 165–166). Authors even write that “the credit has to be given to the German 
commandment” (надо отдать должное германскому командованию) for the way that lib-
erating East Prussia was carried out (Кретинин, 2007b, p. 172). At the same time authors 
note the importance of the 1914 campaign in the German nationalist symbolic of the in-
terwar period. They give the Tannenberg Memorial as an example (Tannenberg denkmal; 
Кретинин, 2007b, p. 166).
The course books touch upon the behaviour of Russian forces in East Prussia. Authors 
acknowledge that there might have been incidental atrocities committed towards civil-
ians, yet they underline that the majority of Russian troops behaved orderly. To strength-
en this statement authors present testimonies of German citizens who not only confirm 
this correct stance but also oppose other points of view overemphasizing the alleged 
bestiality of Russians on East Prussian soil (Кретинин, 2007b, pp. 166–169). Authors em-
phasize that the question of relations between armed forces and civilians during wartime 
objectively belongs to the list of the most difficult ones and that “East Prussia was no 
exception” (Кретинин, 2007b, p. 169).
Authors seek to highlight the universal atrocity affecting the mankind in general, re-
gardless of ethnic or political differences. Thousands of casualties of the first mass-scale 
conflict in history of both German and Russian nationalities were buried on numerous 
sites in East Prussia. The course books show the example of a Russo-German graveyard 
in the village of Lasdehnen (contemporary Kranoznamensk) which has been preserved 
until the present day (Кретинин, 2007b, p. 163). In Kaliningrad Oblast there are also sites 
where exclusively Russian soldiers were buried (Кретинин, 2007b, p. 173).
Consequences of the war are described as being of both real and symbolic nature. The 
latter is related to the formal end of the Kingdom of Prussia (which in the course books is 
referred to as the Duchy of Prussia—Герцогство Пруссия). Authors write that East Prussia as 
Page 6 of 17
a separate entity was emblematic of “Germany’s claims towards the Baltic states, Poland, 
[as well as] Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands” (Кретинин, 2007b, p. 179). It did not, 
however, cancel the claims themselves even when the Weimar Republic was established.
The main challenges that East Prussia and the government in Berlin had to face per-
tained to stabilise the political and economic situation of the province. Thanks to inten-
sified efforts and considerable financial support, authors write, it was finally achieved 
(Кретинин, 2007b, pp. 185–187). It was also possible thanks to economic cooperation 
between Germany and Soviet Russia after the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 when bilateral 
diplomatic relations were established. Soviet economic presence in East Prussia was vis-
ible notably through the East German Trade Fair (the Ostmesse; Восточная ярмарка) in 
Königsberg (Кретинин, 2007b, pp. 188–190).
The end of the 1930s, however, was marked with increased tensions in Europe which 
resulted in another world war. Authors of the course books start the wartime story 
of East Prussia from 1941, i.e. from the beginning of the so-called Great Patriotic War. 
They also mention, however, that the province took part in the war campaign against 
Poland in September 1939 (Клемешев et al., 2007, pp. 3–4). Although East Prussia is de-
scribed as place d’armes (плацдарм) of Germany’s aggression against the Soviet Union, 
the war seemed to be distant for the inhabitants of the province for three years, with 
the exception of rare air bombings of the Soviet aviation (Кретинин, 2007b, p. 200).
The third part of the course books starts from describing military actions in East 
Prussia in 1944-1945 (with a short introduction referring to September 1939), devoting 
much space to Soviet war heroes: General Ivan D. Chernyakhovsky, Marshall Konstan-
tin K. Rokossovsky, as well as lower rank heroes Alexey I. Tazayev and Sergey I. Gu-
sev, who were killed in action in the province. Particular attention is given to the siege 
of Königsberg, led by General Alexandr M. Vasilevski (Клемешев et al., 2007, pp. 13–18).
The end of the war was followed by the introduction of the Soviet military administra-
tion in East Prussia. Authors show a considerable deal of criticism towards its actions. 
They touch upon the controversial topic of the so-called bounty hunters (трофейные ко-
манды) who did great harm to the regional economy, impeding its reconstruction. As it 
is explained in the course books, such actions were tolerated due to uncertain future 
of the territories conquered by the Red Army.
The course books also encompass the facts about the lives of that part of the Ger-
man population that did not flee their homes, consisting mostly of women, children and 
elders. Authors acknowledge harsh conditions inhabitants had to withstand, including 
constant problems with provisioning and forced labour, for instance, repairing roads and 
dismantling ruins. Although their situation was difficult, Soviet authorities allowed them 
to perform religious practices in churches which was forbidden for Orthodox newcomers 
(Клемешев et al., 2007, pp. 24–25).
In general, the course books tell the story of 1944-1945 and the first post-war years 
in a very objective and unbiased way. While accepting the geopolitical consequences 
of the war they do not omit negative aspects of the new political, economic and social 
circumstances. Students reading the book are likely to understand that history is never 
either just black or white, no matter how trivial such a remark would sound. Authors em-
bark from regional rather than national history narrative. They accept the fact that until 
1945 East Prussia’s administrative language was German. One might wonder that is why 
they consequently use German toponyms (written in Cyrillic) throughout the pre-1945 
chapters and do not mention their contemporary Russian equivalents.
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ThE pOST-2012 cONTExT
The internal situation of the post-Yeltsin Russia has been increasingly determined by poli-
cies formed on the central level. This phenomenon has reversed the inertia of decentrali-
sation and partial regionalisation observed since the last years of existence of the Soviet 
Union (Marciniak, 2001). Back then some regions gained considerable factual autonomy 
due to an insignificant control exercised by Moscow. When Vladimir Putin came to power 
the role of the vast majority of regional authorities quickly changed from moderately in-
dependent players to plain executors of the Kremlin-shaped policies. It has had serious 
consequences on all subjects of the Russian Federation and cannot be explained briefly 
without making major simplifications.
During the 2012 presidential campaign Vladimir Putin published seven articles on dif-
ferent aspects of Russia’s present and future, out of which at least three tackled history 
and culture related issues (Путин, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). Putin sketched the desired path 
of Russia’s development and the set of values that it should abide by. He underlined 
the positive role of the strong state apparatus which had been deeply rooted in the Rus-
sian political culture. He also stressed the need for gradual changes and opposed radical 
moves (Rodkiewicz & Rogoża, 2015, pp. 8–9). Later on, Putin conceptualised and refined 
his points, paving the way for the so-called new conservative project. He suggested that 
Russia is a distinctive civilizational centre and should pursue independent political and cul-
tural policies, in particular within the post-Soviet space (Путин, 2012a).
Putin’s words were soon forged into concrete actions, notably, to further strength-
en soft power instruments that Russia had started to develop couple of years earlier. 
This tendency was envisaged in the 2013 Russia’s foreign policy concept (“Concept 
of the Foreign Policy”, 2013). In order to strengthen the Russian statehood and its ties 
with Russians living abroad, an important role was given to the Russian Orthodox Church, 
traditionally closely linked with the authorities, and the Russkiy Mir Foundation estab-
lished in 2007.
The second game-changer was the outbreak of the so-called Revolution of Dignity in 
Ukraine and the events that followed—annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas. They re-
sulted in sharp deterioration of Russo-Western relations, including sanctions imposed by, 
among others, the European Union and the United States. It coincided with the economic 
slowdown in Russia caused by structural macroeconomic shortcomings, such as corrup-
tion and mismanagement. Together with the growing atmosphere of the ‘new Cold War’, 
the Kremlin turned to well-known tools in order to gain popular support, such as the myth 
of a besieged fortress (осаждённая крепость). According to it, for centuries Russia has 
been surrounded by enemies who have tried to weaken and humiliate the country. Citi-
zens of contemporary Russia should once again unite around their leader to repel the ag-
gressors (Колесников, 2015).
Confrontation invoked by the events of 2012-2014 became visible in Kaliningrad Oblast, 
although with some delay in many important areas of socio-political life of the semiex-
clave. At first, economic downturn was stronger in the region than in Russia in average. 
This created a theoretical danger that Kaliningraders might be willing to show their discon-
tent by taking to the streets similar to 2009 and 2010, which finally did not take place. For 
a number of reasons they either supported Kremlin’s policies or remained passive.
In Moscow’s eyes geostrategic importance of the Oblast prevailed over its coopera-
tion potential towards  its immediate neighbourhood. Its military potential was signifi-
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cantly strengthened (Wiśniewska, Domańska, Strzelecki, Żochowski, Wilk, & Menkiszak, 
2016). Altogether, the region once again was placed at the frontline of political or any 
other kind of confrontation with the West.
Managing the crisis in the Oblast became of significant importance for central authori-
ties in view of the 2018 FIFA World Championship, which will be co-hosted by Kalinin-
grad. Ensuring smooth preparations for the event was the main reason for major shifts in 
the regional administration. Governor Nikolay Tsukanov was temporarily replaced by a si-
lovik Georgi Zinichev. Later on, Zinichev yielded for Anton Alikhanov, a young technocrat 
whose main task was to stabilise economic situation of the region and ensure swift im-
plementation of Kremlin’s policies. His first months in office confirmed this reasoning.
Both new governors limited regional authorities’ engagement in issues connected 
with the pre-war legacy of the Oblast, such as the reconstruction of the historical cen-
tre of Kaliningrad and preservation of pre-1945 buildings. In fact, they narrowed down 
the official historical agenda to the elements directly corresponding to the ‘new Russian 
conservatism’. Alikhanov took an active part in numerous events commemorating Rus-
sia’s presence in East Prussia; for instance, during the Seven Years’ War of 1756-1763, 
when Russian troops came to the province both as an enemy and as an ally. In August 
2017, Alikhanov unveiled a monument devoted to General Field Marshall Pyotr Rumyant-
sev (Сумарокова, 2017). Two weeks later he opened a renewed monument of the bat-
tle of GrossJägersdorf (Гросс-Егерсдорф; contemporary village of Междуречье). During 
the ceremony he said: “Here a whole host of Russian war commanders has written their 
names into the history of this soil with golden letters”3 (“Антон Алиханов открыл”, 2017).
cRITIcISM OF ThE cOuRSE bOOkS
The course books were met with significant criticism the instant they were introduced. 
Main objections pertained to the allegedly pro-German perspective from which the au-
thors told the history of East Prussia. In the books it was acknowledged that throughout 
seven centuries of its existence East Prussia was closely linked with the German culture, 
language and politico-legal reality. Thus, critics argued: “The introduction of the History 
of Western Russia as a regional component in the current time frame (34 hours a year) 
will inevitably provide an incentive to promote separatism and a pro-German orientation 
among the students”4 (Корвин, 2007).
It was, however, not until 2014-2015 that the criticism gained on strength. Tatyana 
Shabayeva expressed her reservations towards the course books in “Литературная газе-
та” in early 2015. While avoiding politically motivated arguments, Shabayeva wrote:
Please read [in the course book for grades 8-9]: “The beginning of the war [East Prussian 
people] welcomed. The war quickly moved eastward from the borders of the Reich. There 
seemed to be no threat to the province. The bombings of the Soviet aviation were a sad 
reminder of the war.” Who should be compared to a young man who learned the history 
of the same people who “welcomed the beginning of the war with satisfaction”? Will he be 
3 Здесь целая плеяда российских военных начальников вписала золотыми буквами свои имена в историю этой 
земли.
4 Внедрение „Истории Западной России” в качестве регионального компонента в нынешнем объёме (34 часа 
в год) неизбежно будет способствовать воспитанию у учащихся сепаратизма и прогерманской ориентации
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able to feel the connection, the continuation between him and the Soviet aviation, which so 
unpleasantly destroys the peace of the province?
The authors of “The History of Western Russia” are apparently not worried. The subject goes 
to the textbook for grades 10-11: “The war came unexpectedly. On 17 August 1944, the Sovi-
et forces reached the border between the USSR and Germany near Schirwindt [contemporary 
village of Kutuzovo].” The children of the Kaliningrad region are again suggested to feel as if 
they were on the German side. Yet it was for the Germans in 1944 that “the war came unex-
pectedly” (which is a bit strange in the face of “nasty bombardments carried out by the So-
viet aviation”) (Шабаева, 2015).5
At that time some voices spoke about the alleged process of königsbergization (which 
might also be referred to as germanisation) of Kaliningrad Oblast as a (geo)political rather 
than cultural phenomenon (Выползов, 2016). It is significant that they were formulated 
shortly after the sharp deterioration of the Russo-Western relations, suggesting that ex-
ploration of the pre-war past had been inspired by external forces intending to weaken 
the “Russianness” of the Oblast. These voices devoted little attention to formulating 
a positive counter-agenda.
The new wave of criticism reached its peak in mid-2017 when the tenth anniversary 
of introducing the regional history course gave a pretext for their deeper assessment. 
In order to present main arguments raised, I have used the round table dedicated to 
the course books, which took place in July 2017, as well as some public statements 
made by prominent figures in Kaliningrad Oblast.
At the round table, Georgiy Biryukov, protoiereus of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
Kaliningrad Oblast, described the course and the course books as “categorically harm-
ful”. He referred to the books in terms of civilizational differences between the East Prus-
sian and Soviet/Russian periods of the region’s history, as well as to the books lacking po-
litical and legal explanations why the Soviet Union conquered East Prussia. He underlined 
that, in particular, the authors did not include references to:
• Churchill’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Ivan Mayski in 1941, in which the for-
mer proposed to split Germany and separate East Prussia;
• the Tehran and Yalta conferences where the fate of Königsberg was discussed;
• the law of the Union Control Council in Germany of 1947 “On the Elimination 
of the Prussian State” (“История Западной России способствует”, 2017).
Similar arguments were expressed by Vladimir Shulgin of the Russian National Line:6
We warned as early as in 2006 that the textbooks “The History of Western Russia” did not 
meet the national interests of Russia. This course, instead of Russian [both русская and 
российская история] history, tells the history of Germany and it does so based on a limited 
5 Вчитайтесь: «Начало войны население встретило с удовлетворением. Боевые действия вскоре 
переместились от границ рейха на восток. Казалось, провинции ничто не угрожает. Неприятным 
напоминанием о войне были редкие бомбардировки советской авиации». С кем должен соотносить себя 
молодой человек, если до сих пор он изучал историю того самого населения, которое «начало войны 
встретило с удовлетворением»? Сможет ли он ощутить связь, преемственность с советской авиацией, 
которая так неприятно тревожила спокойствие провинции? Авторов «Истории Западной России» это, 
кажется, не заботит. Тема перетекает в учебник 10–11-х классов (авторы – А.П. Клемешев, Ю.В. Костяшов, 
Г.М. Фёдоров): «Война пришла неожиданно. Советские войска в районе Ширвиндта 17 августа 1944 года 
вышли на границу между СССР и Германией». Снова детям Калининградской области предлагается 
почувствовать себя на стороне Германии. Это для немцев в 1944 году «война пришла неожиданно» (что 
немного странно после «неприятных бомбардировок советской авиации»).
6 Русская народная линия (Russian National Line) is an “Orthodox informational agency” which was founded 
in St. Petersburg in 2010 after some members of the “Russian Line” (founded in 2008) left the organisation. 
The Russian National Line represents ethno- and religion-nationalist point of view on current developments 
in Russia and its close neighbourhood. It is a fierce opponent of the presence of Western civilisation in the 
Orthodox world.
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range of sources, which does not include those referring to the millennial war of the West 
against the Byzantine Civilisation. This course was written by foreign history specialists and 
one geographer. There was not a single Russian history specialist. Even this fact is an indica-
tor of what the point of view of the authors of the course was. If this course is not corrected, 
it will continue to have an impact not only on schoolchildren and students, but also on those 
who are getting ready to become officers and defenders of the Motherland (“Если не станем 
противостоять в Калининграде”, 2017).7
Maxim Makarov, President of the Russian Community of Kaliningrad Oblast Regional 
NGO,8 pointed to the relation between the ethno-national and civic identity of Russians. 
According to him, the former should be strengthened in order to stop the process of blur-
ring and weakening the latter, also through the course books which has a negative im-
pact on all of those attending schools in the Oblast9 (“Если не станем противостоять в 
Калининграде”, 2017).
Among those taking part in the discussion was Andrey Klemeshev, rector of the Fed-
eral Baltic University in Kaliningrad, who is often referred to as the editor of the whole 
series of the course books by his critics.10 In 2017 he admitted that the current course 
should be replaced by a new one that will reflect the reality better. In particular, it should 
take into consideration the post-war (and, one might suspect, post-Cold War) geopolitics. 
Klemeshev underlined that the whole programme of the regional history was created 
very quickly during a difficult period. Nowadays, while the new programme is being de-
veloped, other events and processes should be stressed in the next generation of course 
books (“Андрей Клемешев: Учебник”, 2017).
One might wonder what is meant by “other events and processes”. An indication 
of that has been given by actions taken by regional government officials at least since 
2016. They mostly revolve around traces of the Russian and Soviet presence in East Prus-
sia before 1944-45. In particular, they are related to the military actions during the Seven 
Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, as well as the World War One. For example, during 
the first of the above-mentioned conflicts all of East Prussia was conquered by Russian 
troops. It was then that Immanuel Kant and other citizens of Königsberg swore allegiance 
to Empress Elisabeth.
cONcLuSION
For a number of years the regional history course taught in schools of Kaliningrad Ob-
last were met with just a moderate criticism. Arguments of its anti-Russian nature were 
raised by a limited circle of institutions and individuals, usually belonging to radical circles. 
7 Мы ещё в 2006 году предостерегали, что учебники «История западной России» не отвечают национальным 
интересам России. Этот курс вместо русской, российской истории рассматривает историю немецкую, 
причём на ограниченном круге источников, который не включает себя источники, говорящие о тысячелет-
ней войне Запада с Византийской цивилизацией. Этот курс писали специалисты по зарубежной истории 
и один географ. Нет ни одного учёного по отечественной истории. Даже этот факт — показатель ориен-
тации авторов курса. Если этот курс не исправить, он и дальше будет оказывать воздействие не только 
на школьников и студентов, но и на тех, кто готовится стать офицерами, защитниками Родины.
8 Regional NGO Russian Community of Kaliningrad Oblast (Региональная общественная организация «Русская об-
щина Калининградской области») was registered only in July 2015 which alone ties the organisation with new 
developments on Russian political and social scene after 2014.
9 Преподавание курса «История западной России» в нынешнем виде размывает этнонациональную 
идентичность русских людей, обучающихся в калининградских школах, что приводит к ослаблению их 
общегражданской российской идентичности.
10 In fact, Klemeshev only co-authored the last part of the series
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For numerous reasons it did not lie in the interest of the central and regional Russian 
authorities to stop or control the revival of the East Prussian narrative in the Oblast. In 
the last two to three years the wave of pessimism has become much stronger. Critics 
who reprimanded the manner in which the last years of the existence of East Prussia and 
the foundation of Kaliningrad Oblast were portrayed in the regional history course books 
have embarked from ideological positions which cannot be understood without placing 
them into the Russian-wide context.
This can be explained in various ways. After more than a decade-long period of grow-
ing interest towards exploring elements of the East Prussian past and attempts to incor-
porate them into the regional history education, opponents of this process started to voice 
their concerns openly and frequently. According to them, some parts of the ‘East Prus-
sian myth’ have come at the expense of the official narrative of the history of the Russian 
state. Critics have argued that the emergence of the myth and anchoring it into the eve-
ryday life of ordinary Kaliningraders has been inspired by actors and events from the out-
side of the region. It has been strictly related to the domestic developments of Russia, as 
well as to its international situation.
The new conservative project pursued by the central Russian authorities has gradu-
ally transposed into numerous parts of the everyday life of ordinary Russians on regional 
and local levels. One of the areas of confrontation that the new conservatism suggests is 
the alleged set of tools that enemies of Russia have at their disposal. The Kremlin does 
not send direct, specific and topic-oriented directions. It rather cares for setting the stage 
for lower level actions which would fill it with proper content. This is why this rhetoric has 
been tailored in order to include regional specifics, such as history, social and economic 
situation, developmental challenges etc. In the case of Kaliningrad Oblast, its historical 
background and proximity to the West (the EU and NATO states) make the core of the re-
gional face of the new conservative agenda. The region is believed to be susceptible to 
the foreign influence which forces the authorities and other institutions close to them to 
take countermeasures.
The discourse on the pre-war history of Kaliningrad Oblast is peculiar in this regard as it 
belongs to the dual-use category, depending on the overall climate of the Russo-Western 
relations. During Tsukanov’s term in office the question of regional history was constantly 
present in the public sphere. It even got envisaged in discussions about concrete projects, 
such as the reconstruction of the historical centre of Kaliningrad or renovation of a few re-
maining pieces of pre-war architecture. Mainly because of these actions the Oblast could 
be perceived as a region close to Europe which looks at its East Prussian (Western) roots 
and takes care of them for numerous reasons. Among them, economic development prob-
ably played the most important role for regional authorities. Although the results of this 
discussion have so far been meagre, they have unleashed a considerable social potential in 
various groups of the region’s population which became visible in many different spheres.
After the 2012-2014 developments in and around Russia the above-mentioned fa-
vourable conditions for exploring the pre-war past of Kaliningrad Oblast came to an end. 
Changes at the top of the regional administration have depicted that further explora-
tion of the pre-war legacy will not rank high on the new governor’s political agenda. On 
the contrary, the time has come to highlight the Russian and Soviet elements of the his-
tory of the Oblast. Not only has it become visible in the new initiatives, but it has also af-
fected the ongoing projects and is likely to affect the existing policies. History education 
is undoubtedly one of them.
Page 12 of 17
In this context, it needs to be stated that the course books present a highly unbiased 
story of how East Prussia existed in pre-1945 Germany. Their authors focus on the prov-
ince itself rather than on German or Russian nation-state historiographical perspectives. 
The books tell a neutral story of a region that was subject to, willingly or not, supraregion-
al events and processes. They do not try to suggest that throughout the majority of time 
East Prussia’s existence was harmful to the interests of Russia or the Soviet Union. It 
was only the World War Two that led to geopolitical changes, but even then East Prussia 
was merely a passive participant in the aggression planned and put into motion by au-
thorities in Berlin.
One can argue that the lack of blatant “pro-Russianness” or “anti-Westernness” in 
the course books was easier to accept even five years ago. Along with growing assert-
iveness of Moscow’s foreign policy it became less and less sustainable. When tensions 
reached their critical point in 2014, the hitherto framework of the Russo-Western coop-
eration took a strong hit. Since then notions such as the königsbergization have gained 
popularity in regional media mostly because they have corresponded to the post-2014 
Kremlin-shaped national agenda which has heavily exploited the narrative of a ‘besieged 
fortress’ and a civilizational conflict.
Under such circumstances there is little place for presenting the history of a region 
which objectively is not deeply embedded into the traditionally understood “Russian-
ness”. Such a sharp reaction of those opposing the narrative present in the course books 
also points to the fact that there has been a well-established feeling in the region that 
the level of cultural, religious and social integration between Kaliningrad Oblast and ‘main-
land’ Russia has to be increased. This feeling is probably shared by the central authorities. 
From their point of view, such policies serve predominantly geopolitical and geostrategic 
purpose. Thus, the criticism against the course books is fully in line with the current pace 
and direction of developments in Russia, although, it is perceived somewhat differently 
on regional and central levels. Nevertheless, it transposes into similar actions and tools 
used on the ground, such as engagement of the Russian Orthodox Church and numerous 
cultural organisations into the work on the ground.
The course books on the pre-1945 history of Kaliningrad Oblast will probably be re-
written as a part of a larger programme encompassing over 40 of such publications Rus-
sia-wide. The contents of them, however, will not disappear. The reason for this is that 
the presence of the pre-war past far exceeds the narrow educational system framework. 
It will remain one of the main topics in the regional media, as well as in everyday talks 
and activities of ordinary Kaliningraders. On the other hand, the discussion in the spirit 
of discovering and understanding the pre-war past in a non-biased and non-politically mo-
tivated way will remain being affected by Russia-wide and international circumstances. 
Where it will bring the debate as a whole is yet to be observed.
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